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Introduction
“The methods of ethnology” is among the two most taught and anthologized essay by Franz 
Boas, the founder of American anthropology, and I include it here to give you a sense of who 
Boas was and what he thought. Boas is famous for doing ethnography, not talking about it. As a 
result it is extremely difficult to find explicit theoretical statements from him regarding what 
anthropology is or should be. There are three main texts that represent Boas at his most explicit: 
“the study of geography” is Boas’s earliest and most general statement, followed by “limitations”  
in the 1890s. “Methods” was written in 1920, and represents Boas’s views at the time that he had 
finally achieved institutional dominance in anthropology.
In “Methods” Boas constructs a three way comparison between his own American approach 
and that of two other schools of thought found in Europe. The first school is what I will refer to 
as the “evolutionists,” who Boas also refers to as universalists, or theorists of “development by 
inner causes.” This positions hold that all societies evolve through set stages of development, and 
some are more ahead of others in this regard. The second school is, confusingly, called 
“diffusionism” or “world diffusionists” (the label I’ll use) which is similar to Boas’s diffusionism 
but distinct from it in key ways. World diffusion assumes that culture traits do not change over 
time, but diffuse from one central area across the entire globe. Thus Polynesian outrigger canoes, 
on this view, might originally be from Ancient Egypt and have over the course of thousands of 
years diffused to the Pacific.
Boas disagrees with both of these views. He argues that both of these positions make 
assumptions about human culture and then fit the evidence into those assumptions, rather than 
attempting to work inductively from the data to theory. Boas says that this act of theorizing is 
important, but cannot be done at the moment because we simply do not have enough data. This 
empiricism and skepticism for accepted narratives is still with us in anthropology. 
It is also worth noting that Boas is also interested in process, change, and the dynamism of 
culture -- another hallmark of our discipline. In fact Boas uses the term “dynamic” five times in 
this paper, and argues that “All cultural forms... appear in a constant state of flux and subject to 
fundamental modifications.” This is why world diffusionism cannot be correct -- culture traits do 
not stay the same for thousands of years as they traverse the globe. So Boas is interested in 
diffusion, he just doesn’t think it takes the form that world diffusionists such as Elliot Smith 
believe it does.
Finally, Boas shares an interest with the evolutionists: the way in which ‘inner needs’ or 
‘tendencies’ shape the way that culture traits which diffuse into an area are integrated into its 
culture. However, where evolutionists see all cultures as sharing the same developmental 
program, Boas believes each one has its own unique developmental urges -- its own 
‘configuration,’ as Ruth Benedict would call it. And indeed this is the basic vision of the Boasian 
program: ‘history’ (or historical processes) diffuses traits across the world, while 
‘psychology’ (or cultural patterns) then integrate them into local cultural configurations.  This is 
why Boas points out the importance of studies of acculturation -- something that would move to 
the forefront of anthropology in the years leading up to World War II.
❀
“Methods” is a short piece, and I have given it a very light treatment. I have deleted 
extraneous phrases and qualifications which weigh down Boas’s prose. I have also cut Boas’s 
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reference to scholars who are no longer widely read, while keeping citations of better-known 
scholars. My goal has been to give the reader a cleaner, more legible Boas to encounter, and of 
course to lead them back to the original text.
I hope that this paper, like the others in this series, will help present early anthropological 
theory in a form that is accessible to everyone. There is today a tremendous amount of material 
which is open access, but it is difficult to find, inconvenient to read, and many people do not 
know where to start looking for it. By curating a selection of important open access work, I hope 
to make open access resources better known and to raise awareness of the actual history of 
anthropological theory.
-R
18 January 2014
Honolulu
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The Methods of Ethnology
By Franz Boas
During the last ten years the methods of inquiry into the historical development of 
civilization have undergone remarkable changes. During the second half of the last century 
evolutionary thought held almost complete sway and investigators like Spencer, Morgan, Tylor, 
Lubbock were under the spell of the idea of a general, uniform evolution of culture in which all 
parts of mankind participated. The newer development [that is, the study of diffusion] goes back 
in part to the influence of Ratzel whose geographical training impressed him with the importance 
of diffusion and migration. The problem of diffusion was taken up in detail particularly in 
America, but was applied in a much wider sense by Foy and Graebner, and finally seized upon in 
a still wider application by Elliot Smith and Rivers, so that at the present time, at least among 
certain groups of investigators in England and also in Germany, ethnological research is based on 
the concept of migration and dissemination rather than upon that of evolution.
The evolutionary point of view presupposes that the course of historical changes in the 
cultural life of mankind follows definite laws which are applicable everywhere, and that cultural 
development is, in its main lines, the same among all races and all peoples. This idea is clearly 
expressed by Tylor in the introductory pages of his classic work "Primitive Culture." As soon as 
we admit that the hypothesis of a uniform evolution has to be proved before it can be accepted, 
the whole structure loses its foundation. It is true that similar customs are found in the most 
diverse and widely separated parts of the globe. The occurrence of these similarities which are 
distributed so irregularly that they cannot readily be explained on the basis of diffusion, is one of 
the foundations of the evolutionary hypothesis. On the other hand, the hypothesis implies that 
our modern Western European civilization represents the highest cultural development towards 
which all other more primitive cultural types tend, and that, therefore, retrospectively, we 
construct an orthogenetic development towards our own modern civilization. It is clear that if we 
admit that there may be different ultimate and co-existing types of civilization, the hypothesis of 
one single general line of development cannot be maintained.
Opposed to these assumptions is the modern tendency to deny the existence of a general 
evolutionary scheme. In its place it is assumed that identity of development in two different parts 
of the globe must always be due to migration and diffusion. On this basis historical contact is 
demanded for enormously large areas. The theory demands a high degree of stability of cultural 
traits, and it is based on the supposed correlation between a number of diverse and mutually 
independent cultural traits which reappear in the same combinations in distant parts of the world.
If the hypothetical foundations of these two extreme forms of ethnological research are 
broadly stated, it is clear that the correctness of the assumptions has not been demonstrated, but 
that arbitrarily one or the other has been selected for the purpose of obtaining a consistent picture 
of cultural development. These methods are essentially forms of classification of the static 
phenomena of culture according to two distinct principles, without any attempt to prove that this 
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interpretation is justifiable. To give an example: In most parts of the world there are 
resemblances between decorative forms that are representative and others that are more or less 
geometrical. According to the evolutionary point of view, the most representative forms are 
placed at the beginning. The other forms are so placed that they show a gradual transition from 
representative forms to purely conventional geometric forms, and is then interpreted as meaning 
that geometric designs originated from representative designs which gradually degenerated. 
While I do not deny that this development may have occurred, it would be rash to generalize and 
to claim that in every case the classification which has been made according to a definite 
principle represents an historical development. The order might as well be reversed and we might 
begin with a simple geometric element which, by the addition of new traits, might be developed 
into a representative design, and we might claim that this order represents an historical sequence. 
Neither theory can be established without actual historical proof.
While ethnographical research based on these two hypotheses characterize[s] European 
thought, a different method is pursued by the majority of American anthropologists. American 
scholars are primarily interested in the dynamic phenomena of cultural change, and try to 
elucidate cultural history by the application of the results of their studies; they relegate the 
solution of the ultimate question of the relative importance of parallelism as against worldwide 
diffusion to a future time when the actual conditions of cultural change are better known. The 
American ethnological methods are analogous to those of European, particularly of 
Scandinavian, archaeology, and of the researches into the prehistoric period of the eastern 
Mediterranean area.
It may seem to the distant observer that American students are engaged in a mass of detailed 
investigations without much bearing upon the solution of the ultimate problems of a philosophic 
history of human civilization. This interpretation would be unjust because the ultimate questions 
are as near to our hearts as they are to those of other scholars, only we do not hope to be able to 
solve an intricate historical problem by a formula.
First of all, the whole problem of cultural history appears to us as a historical problem. In 
order to understand history it is necessary to know not only how things are, but how they have 
come to be. In the domain of ethnology, where, for most parts of the world, no historical facts are 
available except those that revealed by archaeological study, all evidence of change can be 
inferred only by indirect methods. Their character is represented in the researches of students of 
comparative philology. The method is based on the comparison of static phenomena combined 
with the study of their distribution. What can be done by this method is well illustrated by Dr. 
Lowie's investigations of the military societies of the Plains Indians. It is, of course, true that we 
can never hope to obtain incontrovertible data relating to the chronological sequence of events, 
but certain general broad outlines can be ascertained with a high degree of probability, even of 
certainty.
As soon as these methods are applied, primitive society loses the appearance of absolute 
stability which is conveyed to the student who sees a certain people only at a certain given time. 
All cultural forms rather appear in a constant state of flux and subject to fundamental 
modifications.
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It is intelligible why in our studies the problem of dissemination should take a prominent 
position. It is much easier to prove dissemination than to follow up developments due to inner 
forces, and the data for such a study are obtained with much greater difficulty. They may, 
however, be observed in every phenomenon of acculturation in which foreign elements are 
remodeled according to the patterns prevalent in their new environment. The reason why the 
study of inner development has not been taken up energetically, is not due to the fact that it is 
unimportant, it is rather due to the inherent methodological difficulties. In recent years attention 
is being drawn to this problem, as is manifested by the investigations on the processes of 
acculturation and of the interdependence of cultural activities which are attracting the attention 
of many investigators.
The further pursuit of these inquiries emphasizes the importance of a feature which is 
common to all historic phenomena. While in natural sciences we are accustomed to consider a 
given number of causes and to study their effects, in historical happenings we are compelled to 
consider every phenomenon not only as effect but also as cause. This is true even in the 
particular application of the laws of physical nature, as, for instance, in the study of astronomy in 
which the position of certain heavenly bodies at a given moment may be considered as the effect 
of gravitation, while, at the same time, their particular arrangement in space determines future 
changes. This relation appears much more clearly in the history of human civilization. To give an 
example: a surplus of food supply is liable to bring about an increase of population and an 
increase of leisure, which gives opportunity for occupations that are not absolutely necessary for 
the needs of every day life. In turn the increase of population and of leisure, which maybe 
applied to new inventions, give rise to a greater food supply and to a further increase in the 
amount of leisure, so that a cumulative effect results.
Similar considerations may be made in regard to the important problem of the relation of the 
individual to society, a problem that has to be considered whenever we study the dynamic 
conditions of change. The activities of the individual are determined to a great extent by his 
social environment, but his own activities influence the society in which he lives, and may bring 
about modifications in its form. Obviously, this problem is one of the most important ones to be 
taken up in a study of cultural changes. It is also beginning to attract the attention of students 
who are no longer satisfied with the systematic enumeration of standardized beliefs and customs 
of a tribe, but who begin to be interested in the question of the way in which the individual reacts 
to his whole social environment, and to the differences of opinion and of mode of action that 
occur in primitive society and which are the causes of far-reaching changes.
In short then, the method which we try to develop is based on a study of the dynamic changes 
in society that may be observed at the present time. We refrain from the attempt to solve the 
fundamental problem of the general development of civilization until we have been able to 
unravel the processes that are going on under our eyes.
Certain general conclusions may be drawn from this study. First of all, the history of human 
civilization does not appear to us as determined entirely by psychological necessity that leads to 
a uniform evolution the world over. We rather see that each cultural group has its own unique 
history, dependent partly upon the peculiar inner development of the social group, and partly 
3
upon the foreign influences to which it has been subjected. There have been processes of gradual 
differentiation as well as processes of leveling down differences between neighboring cultural 
centers, but it would be quite impossible to understand, on the basis of a single evolutionary 
scheme, what happened to any particular people. An example of the contrast between the two 
points of view is clearly indicated by a comparison of the treatment of Zuñi civilization by Frank 
Hamilton Cushing on the one hand, on the other by modern students, particularly by Elsie Clews 
Parsons, A. L. Kroeber and Leslie Spier. Cushing believed that it was possible to explain Zuñi 
culture entirely on the basis of the reaction of the Zuñi mind to its geographical environment, and 
that the whole of Zuñi culture could be explained as the development which followed necessarily  
from the position in which the people were placed. Cushing's keen insight into the Indian mind 
and his thorough knowledge of the most intimate life of the people gave great plausibility to his 
interpretations. On the other hand, Dr. Parsons' studies prove conclusively the deep influence 
which Spanish ideas have had upon Zuñi culture, and, together with Professor Kroeber's 
investigations, give us one of the best examples of acculturation that have come to our notice. 
The psychological explanation is entirely misleading and the historical study shows us an 
entirely different picture, in which the unique combination of ancient traits and of European 
influences, have brought about the present condition.
Studies of the dynamics of primitive life also show that an assumption of long continued 
stability such as is demanded by Elliot Smith is without any foundation in fact. Wherever 
primitive conditions have been studied in detail, they can be proved to be in a state of flux, and it 
would seem that there is a close parallelism between the history of language and the history of 
general cultural development. Periods of stability are followed by periods of rapid change. It is 
exceedingly improbable that any customs of primitive people should be preserved unchanged for 
thousands of years. Furthermore, the phenomena of acculturation prove that a transfer of customs 
from one region into another without concomitant changes are very rare. It is, therefore, very 
unlikely that ancient Mediterranean customs could be found at the present time practically 
unchanged in different parts of the globe, as Elliot Smith's theory demands.
While the unique historical character of cultural growth stands out as a salient element in the 
history of cultural development, we may recognize that certain typical parallelisms do occur. We 
are, however, not inclined to look for these similarities in detailed customs but rather in certain 
dynamic conditions which are due to social or psychological causes that are liable to lead to 
similar results. The example of the relation between food supply and population to which I 
referred before may serve as an example. Another type of example is those cases in which a 
certain problem may be solved by a limited number of methods only. When we find, for instance, 
marriage as a universal institution, it may be recognized that marriage is possible only between a 
number of men and a number of women; a number of men and one woman; a number of women 
and one man; or one man and one woman. As a matter of fact, all these forms are found the 
world over and it is not surprising that analogous forms have been adopted independently in 
different parts of the world, and, considering both the general economic conditions of mankind 
and the character of sexual instinct in the higher animals, it also does not seem surprising that 
group marriage and polyandrous marriages should be comparatively speaking rare. In short, if 
4
we look for laws, the laws relate to the effects of physiological, psychological, and social 
conditions, not to sequences of cultural achievement.
In some cases a regular sequence of these may accompany the development of the 
psychological or social status. This is illustrated by the sequence of industrial inventions in the 
Old World and in America, which I consider as independent. A period of food gathering and of 
the use of stone was followed by the invention of agriculture, of pottery and finally of the use of 
metals. Obviously, this order is based on the increased amount of time given by mankind to the 
use of natural products, of tools and utensils, and to the variations that developed with it. 
Although in this case parallelism seems to exist on the two continents, it would be futile to try to 
follow out the order in detail. As a matter of fact, it does not apply to other inventions. The 
domestication of animals, which, in the Old World must have been an early achievement, was 
very late in the New World.
A similar consideration may be made in regard to the development of rationalism. It seems to 
be one of the fundamental characteristics of the development of mankind that activities which 
have developed unconsciously are gradually made the subject of reasoning. We may observe this 
process everywhere. It appears, perhaps, most clearly in the history of science which has 
gradually extended the scope of its inquiry over an ever-widening field and which has raised into 
consciousness human activities that are automatically performed in the life of the individual and 
of society.
I have not heretofore referred to another aspect of modern ethnology which is connected with 
the growth of psycho-analysis. Sigmund Freud has attempted to show that primitive thought is in 
many respects analogous to those forms of individual psychic activity which he has explored by 
his psycho-analytical methods. While some of the ideas underlying Freud's psycho-analytic 
studies may be fruitfully applied to ethnological problems, the one-sided exploitation of this 
method will [not] advance our understanding of the development of human society. It is true that 
the influence of impressions received during the first few years of life have been entirely 
underestimated, and that many so-called racial or hereditary traits are to be considered rather as a 
result of early exposure to a certain form of social conditions. If, however, we try to apply the 
whole theory of the influence of suppressed desires to the activities of man living under different 
social forms, we extend beyond their legitimate limits the inferences that may be drawn from the 
observation of normal and abnormal individual psychology. Many other factors are of greater 
importance. To give an example: The phenomena of language show clearly that conditions quite 
different from those to which psycho-analysts direct their attention determine the mental 
behavior of man. The general concepts underlying language are entirely unknown to most 
people. Nevertheless, the categories of language compel us to see the world arranged in certain 
definite conceptual groups which, on account of our lack of knowledge of linguistic processes, 
are taken as objective categories and which, therefore, impose themselves upon the form of our 
thoughts. It is not known what the origin of these categories may be, but it seems quite certain 
that they have nothing to do with the phenomena which are the subject of psycho-analytic study.
The applicability of the psycho-analytic theory of symbolism is also open to the greatest 
doubt. We should remember that symbolic interpretation has occupied a prominent position in 
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the philosophy of all times. It is present not only in primitive life, but the history of philosophy 
and of theology abounds in examples of a high development of symbolism, the type of which 
depends upon the general mental attitude of the philosopher who develops it. The theologians 
who interpreted the Bible on the basis of religious symbolism were no less certain of the 
correctness of their views, than the psycho-analysts are of their interpretations of thought and 
conduct based on sexual symbolism. The results of a symbolic interpretation depend primarily 
upon the subjective attitude of the investigator who arranges phenomena according to his leading 
concept. In order to prove the applicability of the symbolism of psycho-analysis, it would be 
necessary to show that a symbolic interpretation from other entirely different points of view 
would not be equally plausible, and that explanations that leave out symbolic significance or 
reduce it to a minimum, would not be adequate.
While, therefore, we may welcome the application of every advance in the method of 
psychological investigation, we cannot accept as an advance in ethnological method the crude 
transfer of a novel, one-sided method of psychological investigation of the individual to social 
phenomena the origin of which can be shown to be historically determined and to be subject to 
influences that are not at all comparable to those that control the psychology of the individual.
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